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We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. 
We test a `greed’ theory focusing on the ability to finance rebellion, against a 
`grievance’ theory focusing on ethnic and religious divisions, political repression and 
inequality. We find that greed considerably outperforms grievance. Consistent with 
the greed theory, both dependence upon primary commodity exports and a large 
diaspora substantially increase the risk of conflict. Inconsistent with the grievance 
theory, greater ethnic and religious diversity reduce the risk of conflict. The results are 
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Civil wars are now far more common than interstate wars. During 1999 there were 27 
major armed conflicts globally, all but two took place within national boundaries. In 
this paper we investigate the causes of civil war using a global data set including 
nations at war as well as peaceful countries. 
 
According to popular perceptions grievances are often seen as the main causes of 
rebellion. However, we suggest that those factors which determine the financial and 
military viability of a rebellion are more important than objective grounds for 
grievance. In order to create and maintain a rebel organization the rebels have to be 
paid and military equipment has to be purchased. To test these alternative hypotheses 
we construct two competing models: a ‘grievance’ and a ‘greed’ model. The 
‘grievance’ model examines inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious 
divisions as causes of conflict, while the ‘greed’ model focuses on the sources of 
finance of civil war. 
 
We find little evidence for grievances as a determinant of conflict. Neither inequality 
nor political oppression increase the risk of conflict. However, we find some evidence 
that societies characterized by ‘ethnic dominance,’ i.e., where one ethnic group makes 
up 45-90 percent of the population, have a systematically higher risk of civil war. Our 
‘greed’ model provides much better explanatory power. We are able to identify 
several sources of finance for rebellions. Income from natural resource predation such 
as diamonds in Angola, drugs in Columbia and timber in Cambodia are often quoted 
as important sources of finance for the rebel movements. Our empirical analysis 
confirms that countries with abundant natural resources have a higher risk of conflict. 
However, the relationship between natural resources and conflict risk is non-linear. 
Countries with a very high dependence on natural resource incomes have a relatively 
lower risk of conflict. We hypothesize that natural resources not only represent a 
source of rebel finance but also of government revenue. In poor countries 
governments often tax primary commodities at high rates and can use this income to 
strengthen the state. Furthermore, we find some evidence that countries with a large 
diaspora abroad experience higher conflict risks. Diasporas, such as for example the 
Kurdish community in Europe, the Lebanese in West-Africa and the Tamils in North 
America, often have the ability to use large financial resources and publicity to keep 
combatants active in their native countries. 
 
In spite of the relatively low explanatory power of the ‘grievance’ model we cannot 
reject it in favor of the ‘greed’ model and thus combine the two models. In addition to 
the factors mentioned above we find that poorer countries are more likely to 
experience civil wars. The opportunity cost for potential rebels are low and thus make 
recruitment easier. A high enrolment rate of males in secondary school also reduces 
the conflict risk.  We also find that history matters. If a country experienced a conflict 
recently the risk of recurrent conflict is high, however, this risk falls proportionately 
to the length of the peace period. Sustained peace makes renewed rebellion less likely. 
Contrary to the ‘grievance’ theory, social fractionalization, measured as religious and 
ethnic diversity, lowers the risk of conflict. Typically rebel organizations recruit their 
members from similar backgrounds and diversity may make it more difficult to 





thus reduce the risk of conflict. We also control for geographical characteristics since 
they are likely to influence combat strategy and thus the relative military capability of 
the regular and rebel forces. We find the risk of civil war to be higher in more 
mountainous nations and countries in which the population is unequally distributed.  
 
Overall, these results are consistent with economic models of conflict risk in which 
the critical parameters are the financial opportunities for rebels, the social and 
geographic constraints which they face, and the financial capability of the government 
to provide defense and other public services.  They are harder to reconcile with 








Civil war effects many of the world’s poorest countries. It is now far more common 
than international conflict: of the 27 major armed conflicts listed by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute for 1999, all but two were internal. 
 
In this paper we develop an econometric model which predicts the outbreak of civil 
conflict. In the process, we compare two contrasting accounts of the causes of 
conflict: preferences and constraints. The political science literature has stressed 
differences between societies in the preference for conflict: societies differ in the 
severity of objective grievances such as political repression or inequality. The 
economics literature has taken rebellion to be an economic activity with pay-offs akin 
to crime, and has focused on differences in constraints. In Section 2 we set out these 
contrasting accounts and discuss measurable variables which might enable us to test 
them. We present descriptive data on the 78 large civil conflicts which occurred 
between 1960 and 1999. In Section 3 we use non-nested tests to discriminate between 
the two accounts of conflict and develop an integrated model which provides a 
synthesis. Section 4 presents a range of robustness checks and Section 5 offers a 
concluding discussion of the results. 
 
We conclude that differences in constraints are far more important in explaining the 
incidence of conflict than are differences in objective grounds for grievance. A 
particularly powerful risk factor is dependence upon primary commodity exports. A 
likely explanation is the scope these activities provide for extortion by rebel 
organizations. Whether such extortion directly motivates rebellion, or simply provides 
critical finance which facilitates the violent pursuit of other objectives, is beyond the 
scope of our paper.      
 
2. Rebellion: Theories and Descriptive Evidence 
 
The definition of a civil war which we use in this paper is of an internal conflict with 
at least 1,000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel organization and 
government forces suffering at least  five percent of these casualties. This definition 
has become standard following the seminal data collection of Singer and Small (1982, 
1994). We use an expanded and updated version of their data set which covers 161 
countries over the period 1960-99 and identifies 78 civil wars. Table 1 lists the civil 
wars. 
                                                 
1 Previous versions of this paper have benefited from presentations at CERDI, NYU, LSE, Oxford, 
Princeton, Lisbon and the World Bank. We would like to thank participants for comments,  especially 





Table 1: Outbreaks Of War 
 
Country  Start of the 
War 









Afghanistan  04/78  02/92       
Afghanistan  05/92  Ongoing  *     
Algeria  07/62  12/62  *     
Algeria  05/91  Ongoing  *  *  * 
Angola  02/61  11/75       
Angola  11/75  05/91  *  *  * 
Angola  09/92  Ongoing  *  *  * 
Azerbaijan  04/91  10/94       
Bosnia  03/92  11/95       
Burma/Myanmar  68  10/80  *  *  * 
Burma/Myanmar  02/83  07/95  *  *  * 
Burundi  04/72  12/73    *  * 
Burundi  08/88  08/88  *  *  * 
Burundi  11/91  ongoing  *  *  * 
Cambodia  03/70  10/91  *     
Chad  03/80  08/88    *   
China  01/67  09/68  *  *   
Columbia  04/84  ongoing  *  *  * 
Congo  97  10/97    *  * 
Cyprus  07/74  08/74    *   
Dominican Rep.  04/65  09/65    *  * 
El Salvador  10/79  01/92    *  * 
Ethiopia  07/74  05/91    *  * 
Georgia  06/91  12/93       
Guatemala  07/66  07/72  *  *  * 
Guatemala  03/78  03/84  *  *  * 
Guinea-Bissau  12/62  12/74       
India  08/65  08/65  *  *  * 
India  84  94  *  *  * 
Indonesia  06/75  09/82  *  *  * 
Iran  03/74  03/75    *  * 
Iran  09/78  12/79  *  *  * 
Iran  06/81  05/82  *  *  * 
Iraq  09/61  11/63  *     
Iraq  07/74  03/75  *  *  * 
Iraq  01/85  12/92  *  *  * 
Jordan  09/71  09/71    *   
Laos  07/60  02/73  *     
Lebanon  05/75  09/92  *     
Liberia  12/89  11/91    *   
Liberia  10/92  11/96  *     
Morocco  10/75  11/89  *  *  * 
Mozambique  10/64  11/75       
Mozambique  07/76  10/92  *  *  * 
Nicaragua  10/78  07/79    *  * 
Nicaragua  03/82  04/90       
Nigeria  01/66  01/70    *  * 





Table 1 continued           
           
Country  Start of the 
War 









Pakistan  03/71  12/71    *  * 
Pakistan  01/73  07/77       
Peru  03/82  12/96    *  * 
Philippines  09/72  12/96  *  *  * 
Romania  12/89  12/89    *  * 
Russia  12/94  08/96       
Russia  09/99  Ongoing  *     
Rwanda  11/63  02/64       
Rwanda  10/90  07/94  *  *  * 
Sierra Leone  03/91  11/96    *  * 
Sierra Leone  05/97  07/99  *  *   
Somalia  04/82  05/88    *  * 
Somalia  05/88  12/92  *  *  * 
Sri Lanka  04/71  05/71    *  * 
Sri Lanka  07/83  ongoing  *  *  * 
Sudan  10/63  02/72       
Sudan  07/83  ongoing  *  *  * 
Tajikistan  04/92  12/94       
Turkey  07/91  ongoing    *  * 
Uganda  05/66  06/66    *  * 
Uganda  10/80  04/88  *  *  * 
Vietnam  01/60  04/75  *     
Yemen  05/90  10/94       
Yemen, Arab Rep.  11/62  09/69  *     
Yemen, People’s Rep.  01/86  01/86  *     
Yugoslavia  04/90  01/92       
Yugoslavia  10/98  04/99  *     
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  07/60  09/65       
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  09/91  12/96  *  *  * 
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  09/97  09/99  *  *  * 
Zimbabwe  12/72  12/79    *  * 
 
Note: Previous Wars include war starts 1945-94. 
 
 
To explain the outbreak of civil war we need to discover the circumstances which 
favor rebellion. A helpful distinction is between preferences and constraints: societies 
can be prone to conflict either because preferences for rebellion are atypically strong, 
or, because constraints upon rebellion are atypically weak. This distinction has fairly 
precisely divided the large political science literature on the causes of conflict from 
the much smaller economics literature. Political scientists have focused upon grounds 
for grievance, such as ethnic hatred, political repression or inequality. Economists 
have usually abstracted from differences in preferences, treating the objective of 
rebellion as financial gain (Grossman, 1999; Collier, 2000). For example, Grossman 






The assumption that rebellions are motivated by greed is merely a special case of the 
focus upon constraints. An alternative constraints-based theory is that of universal 
grievance: all countries might have groups with a sufficiently strong sense of 
grievance to wish to launch a rebellion, so that rebellions will occur where they are 
viable. Thus, it might be argued that both the Michigan Militia in the USA and the 
FARC in Colombia were established to address grievances through rebellion, but only 
in Colombia were the constraints upon rebellion weak enough to enable violence to 
escalate to the level of civil war.  
 
To be viable, a rebel organization must survive militarily against the government 
army, and for this it needs manpower and equipment. In turn, these create the need for 
finance. Hence, both a greed theory and a universal grievance theory predict that the 
risk of rebellion is increasing in the opportunities for rebel finance. That the FARC is 
able to generate around $500m per year from cocaine may have become its rationale, 
or may simply facilitate its original objective. We will refer to the constraint-based 
theories of rebellion by the shorthand of `greed’, to contrast them with preference-
based theories, while recognizing that they do not necessarily literally imply that the 




Only large rebel organizations generate casualties on the scale which defines civil 
war. Typically, in civil wars rebel organizations have between 500 and 5,000 
employees but can be much larger: UNITA, the rebel organization in Angola, at its 
peak had around 60,000. Rebel organizations combine this pool of largely unskilled 
labor with guns, and with this endowment must raise considerable finance to meet 
their expenses. We consider three sources of finance which are widely used by rebel 
organizations: extortion, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile 
governments.  
 
We propose that the endowment of unskilled labor and guns which characterizes rebel 
organizations is particularly suited to raise finance through the extortion of primary 
commodity exports. Several high-profile examples, such as diamonds in Sierra Leone 
and Angola, timber in Cambodia, and cocaine in Colombia, give the proposition at 
least superficial plausibility. Our proposition can equivalently be interpreted in two 
ways. On the universal grievance interpretation rebellions need to finance themselves, 
and the extortion of primary commodity exports offers the best opportunity for 
financial viability. In the limit, only where there are such opportunities can rebel 
organizations escalate to the scale needed for civil war. On the literal greed 
interpretation the extortion of primary commodity exports will occur where it is 
profitable, and the organizations which perpetrate this extortion will need to take the 
form of a rebellion.  
 
Even if rebel organizations are quasi-criminal (by choice or necessity), their niche in 
the crime market is specialized. Most crime is subject to scale diseconomies and so a 
large organization would be out-competed by smaller enterprises. Extortion normally 
offers some scale economies in violence and so is organized in larger enterprises than 
other crime (Konrad and Skaperdas, 1998). The extortion of primary commodities 





extortion targets urban-based commerce, rebellions target the production or 
transportation of primary commodities, and these locations are usually rural. This 
affects the technology of defense. As with other crime, the returns on extortion can be 
decreased by defensive measures. However, whereas the most efficient defenders of 
commerce are probably detectives, primary commodities need defense of a large 
physical space best suited to an army. The high location-specific rents which 
characterize primary commodity exports not only attract rebel extortion but also 
induce governments to impose heavy taxation. Taxation gives governments both an 
incentive and a means to provide military defense. Faced with a military defense, a 
viable extortion racket itself needs considerable military power. Whereas a normal 
extortion racket merely needs sufficient force to menace its victims (and perhaps to 
defend itself from rivals), primary commodity extortion needs enough force to be able 
to survive in confrontation with the army.  These greater scale economies of violence 
produce an industrial structure of fewer, larger organizations than in commercial 
extortion. The largest of these violent, quasi-criminal organizations will sometimes 
meet the criteria for civil war.     
 
Suppose that the rebel organization depends for its finance on the extortion of primary 
commodity exports, while the government raises finance both from heavy taxation of 
primary exports and from lighter taxation of other income. Differences in the both the 
structure of income and its level now give rise to differential proneness to conflict. 
Consider, first, the structure of income. Evidently, countries without primary 
commodity exports do not offer opportunities for their extortion and so should have a 
low risk of civil war. However, the USA has abundant primary commodity exports 
and yet these did not provide extortion opportunities to the Michigan Militia. Clearly, 
one factor in the USA was that the government was sufficiently rich to provide an 
effective defense. The scale of rebel force necessary for survival against the military 
forces of the US government, while unavoidably exposing itself through operating a 
primary commodity extortion racket, is evidently so large that the required financing 
is prohibitive. More generally, the threshold of rebel force required for survival is 
increasing in the government’s military expenditure. As a result, the viability of 
rebellion need not be continuously increasing in the endowment of primary 
commodity exports. Beyond some point, the increment in potential rebel revenue may 
be more than offset by the increased rebel expenditure needed to survive against 
augmented government forces. 
 
Before investigating the effect of primary commodities formally, it is useful to review 
some descriptive statistics.
2 In Table 2, we measure the ratio of primary commodity 
exports to GDP for each of the 161 countries. As with our other variables, we measure 
at five year intervals starting in 1960 and ending in 1995. We then take the history of 
conflict in the subsequent five years, and compare those in which a conflict broke out 
with those which were conflict free. Those in which conflict broke out were on 
average slightly less dependent upon primary commodity exports than those which 
sustained peace: 15 percent versus 17 percent. However, the standard deviation for the 
conflict countries is only about half that of the countries which sustained peace. The 
countries in which conflict broke out tended to be grouped around average 
dependence, whereas the countries which sustained peace tended to have either 
markedly below-average or markedly above-average dependence. 
                                                 






Controlling for the structure of income, an increase in the level of income is likely to 
favor the government since, as income rises, the share of income taken in taxation 
also tends to rise. As the government is strengthened financially relative to the rebels, 
the risk of conflict is likely to be reduced. In Table 2 we repeat the comparison, this 
time in terms of the level of income rather than its structure. There is a very marked 
difference: the countries in which conflict subsequently broke out had less than half 
the mean income of those which sustained peace ($1645 per capita versus $4219 per 
capita). 
 
A second potential source of rebel finance is from diasporas living in developed 
countries: a well-documented example is the assistance provided to the Tamil Tiger 
organization of Sri Lanka by Tamils in north America but the phenomenon is more 
general (Angoustures and Pascal, 1996). There are several reasons to expect that 
diasporas would increase the provision of finance for rebellion. Diasporas are usually 
much richer than the population in their country of origin. They are better-placed for 
collective action: emigrants have a cultural incentive to create diaspora organizations 
which can then discipline free-riding. They do not suffer the consequences of the 
conflict. Diasporas may harbor historical grievances which the rebel organization can 
exploit. We measured the size of the diaspora from US Census data. Although this 
neglects diasporas living in other countries, it has the major advantage of greater 
uniformity in the aggregate: an immigrant to the USA is evidently not operating in the 
same legal, organizational or economic environment as an immigrant to France. We 
measure the importance of the diaspora by comparing the number of immigrants from 
a country currently resident in the USA, with the domestic population of the country. 
In the formal analysis we decompose the diaspora into that part induced by conflict 
and that which is exogenous to conflict, but here we simply consider the crude 
numbers. Superficially, the data does not appear to support the hypothesis that 
diasporas increase the risk of conflict: diasporas are substantially smaller in the 
countries in which conflict subsequently broke out.  
 
A third potential source of rebel finance is from hostile governments. An example 
would be the role of the government of Southern Rhodesia in financing the Renamo 
rebellion in Mozambique. To investigate the proposition empirically, we need some 
proxy for the willingness of foreign governments to finance military opposition to the 
incumbent government. We use the contrast between the Cold War and post-Cold 
War periods as such a proxy. During the Cold War each great power tried to 
destabilize those countries allied to the opposing power. The incentive to support 
rebel movements was reduced once the Cold War ended and so, to the extent that this 
source of finance is important as a cause of conflict, we would expect a reduction in 
its incidence post-1989. We should note that this is a controversial prediction. For 
example, Kaplan (2000) argues that the end of the Cold War `lifted the lid’ off 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our focus has so far been on the differential scope for raising rebel revenue. We now 
turn to rebel expenditure, and consider differential costs. Superficially, it might appear 
that the rebels and the government face the same recruitment problem. However, this 
ignores an important difference. To initiate rebellion the rebel force must grow 
rapidly, whereas the government army can be presumed to be in steady state with a 
relatively low rate of turnover. This may make the rebel organization more sensitive 
to the current state of the labor market. Controlling for the level of per capita income, 
the tighter is the market for young male labor, the more difficult is the rebel 
recruitment problem. This is consistent with evidence that the faster the rate of growth 
the lower is the probability of unconstitutional political change (Alesina et al. 1996).
3 
The Russian civil war of 1919-21 illustrates the effect of short term opportunity cost 
on the rebel recruitment problem. The Reds and the Whites, both rebel organizations, 
suffered massive desertion (the obverse of the recruitment problem) with some four 
million men quitting. The desertion rate was ten times higher in summer than in 
winter: the recruits being peasants, the opportunity cost of their labor was much 
higher at harvest time (Figgis, 1997). We measure the state of the labor market 
through two proxies: the rate of economic growth per capita and the proportion of 
young males enrolled in secondary education. To reduce problems of endogeneity, we 
measure these over the five year period prior to the one in which we assess the 
conflict history. From the descriptive statistics both variables appear to matter: the 
countries with subsequent conflicts had slower economic growth and lower school 
enrollment.  
 
A further potential influence on rebel costs is the presence of accumulated physical, 
human and organizational capital. If a country has previously had a rebellion there 
will be a stock of guns, former rebels who know how to use them, and probably a 
persistent, if quiescent, rebel organization. Hence, the costs of renewed rebellion are 
likely to be lower than those of initial rebellion. In our sample, the conflict episodes 
were twice as likely in countries which had had a previous conflict since 1945 as in 
those which had been peaceful. However, this cannot necessarily be interpreted as 
indicating that conflict increases the risk of further conflict. The pattern may be due to 
fixed characteristics which make conflict more likely. A dummy variable for a 
previous history of conflict is interpretable either as a proxy for accumulated 
rebellion-specific capital or as a proxy for omitted fixed effects. However, since 
capital decays this provides a way of distinguishing between it and fixed effects. We 
introduce a variable measuring the time since the previous conflict (with a maximum 
back to 1945). On average, conflict episodes are preceded by a much shorter period of 
peace.  
 
In addition to revenues and costs, a further observable factor which can be expected 
systematically to affect the military feasibility of rebellion is geography. Forest cover 
may provide rebels with a safe haven. American efforts at defoliation in Vietnam 
suggest that this is at least perceived as militarily important. We investigate this 
                                                 
3 The economic growth literature concentrates on the analysis of political instability as a determinant of 
economic growth (see for example Barro 1991, 1997). Alesina et al (1996) estimate a simultaneous 
equation system of economic growth and political instability. They present support for the hypothesis 
that political instability reduces growth. Lower growth does not seem to cause political instability, 
defined as the number of government changes. However, when they define political instability more 
narrowly as unconstitutional government changes they find that lower growth rates are a causal factor 





through the FAO measure of the proportion of a country’s terrain which is covered in 
forest. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 show that war countries actually 
had a slightly lower forest coverage (29 percent) than peaceful countries (31 percent). 
Similarly,  mountainous terrain may provide a safe haven. We could find no 
equivalent data set on the proportion of a country’s terrain which is mountainous. 
Crude measures such as altitude tend to misclassify both plateaus and rugged uplands. 
We therefore commissioned a new index from John Gerrard, a physical geographer 
specialized in mountainous terrain. The descriptive statistics suggest that mountainous 
terrain is important: in civil war countries 25 percent of their terrain is mountainous, 
while only 15 percent of the terrain of the average peaceful country consists of 
mountainous terrain. Geographic dispersion of the population may make military 
control more difficult: Herbst (2000) suggests that Zaire is intrinsically prone to 
rebellion because its population lives around the edges of the country, in contrast, say, 
to Egypt. To test this we calculated a Gini coefficient of population dispersion. For 
the calculation of the Gini coefficient we used the population data per 400km cell. 
Analogous to the income Gini coefficient, the Gini coefficient of population 
dispersion will be high if the country’s population is concentrated in a relatively small 
area of the country. In fact, the concentration of the population is slightly lower in 
peaceful countries (0.57) than in war countries (0.6). The remaining geographic 
variables were population, population density and the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas. For all series the data source is World Bank (2000). Population 
is likely to be correlated with conflict risk. If two identical areas, each with a conflict 
risk of p, are treated as a single area, the conflict risk for the single area rises to 2p – 
p
2. Since p is small (0.07 at the mean), this effect alone would yield an elasticity of 
conflict risk with respect to population of slightly less than unity. If there are scale 
economies in defense, the elasticity would be reduced. Empirically, peaceful countries 
have on average less than half the population of conflict countries, they have higher 
population density, and are more urbanized. 
 
In war, both finance and geography may be less important than cohesion. The 
government army has two advantages over a rebellion. It can spend many years 
building a sense of unity, whereas if a rebel force fails to achieve unity quickly it will 
presumably perish. Additionally, the government can use the powerful rhetoric of 
nationalism: with this imagined identity already occupied, a rebellion needs an 
alternative. The need for rapid cohesion constrains recruitment: rebellion cannot 
afford diversity. There is now evidence that ethnic and religious diversity within 
various types of organization tends to reduce the ability to cooperate (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997, Alesina et al, 1999, Collier, 2001). A rebellion needs cooperative 
behavior and so it will tend to recruit only within a single ethnic/religious group. The 
need for homogeneity has a startling implication: rebellions should be more difficult 
the more diverse is the society since the recruitment pool becomes more restricted. 
The most widely used measure of ethnic diversity is the index of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization which measures the probability of two randomly drawn people being 
from different ethnic groups.
4 On average, the conflict societies are more 
fractionalized than the peaceful societies. We could find no measure of religious 
fractionalization, but we constructed one equivalent to that of ethnic fractionalization 
                                                 
4 This ethnolinguistic fractionalization index was for example used by Mauro (1995) and Easterly and 
Levine (1997, 1998). We relied upon the original source, Atlas Narodov Mira (USSR, 1964), and 





using data from Barrett (1982).
5 Religious fractionalization is similar in conflict and 
peaceful societies. Potentially, ethnic and religious diversity interact. If ethnic and 
religious divisions are cross-cutting then social fractionalization is much greater than 
the sum of ethnic and religious fractionalization. We could find no data on how 
religious and ethnic divisions are related and so we allow for the possibility that they 
are cross-cutting, a concept we refer to as social fractionalization. If there were e 
equally sized ethnic groups and r equally sized religious groups, maximum potential 
social fractionalization would be measured simply by the product e
￿
￿ .  However, since 
both the underlying indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization range on the scale 
0-100, their product is zero if there is either religious or ethnic homogeneity whereas 
there is social homogeneity only if both indices are zero. We therefore measure social 
fractionalization as the sum of the product of the underlying indices and whichever is 




We now switch from a focus upon the constraints facing rebellion to a focus upon 
preferences. To what extent is the initiation of rebellion determined by differences in 
objective grievances? We consider three grievances: inter-group hatred, political 
exclusion and vengeance.  
 
Inter-ethnic, or inter-religious hatreds are probably the most common explanation for 
civil conflict. A possible example might be Bosnia. Although such hatreds cannot be 
quantified, they can evidently only occur in societies which are multi-ethnic or multi-
religious. We have already discussed measures of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization: inter-group hatreds must be greater in societies which are 
fractionalized than in those which are homogenous. However, such hatreds need not 
be monotonic in fractionalization because polarized societies may generate more 
tensions than highly fractionalized societies. Esteban and Ray (1999) and Reynal-
Querol (2000) suggest that it is polarization which increases the risk of conflict. 
Esteban and Ray (1994) consider how polarization can be measured. They show that 
the allowable class of measures is quite limited. Using data on ethno-linguist groups 










j i d K P
1 1
1 p p
a   
 
where  i p denotes the percentage of people that belong to group i in the total 
population, i=1, …, n. This measure of polarization depends on the parameters K and 





￿  the 
polarization measure is equal to the Gini coefficient of inequality. Esteban and Ray 
(1994) show that 
￿  is bounded, otherwise not all of their axioms are fulfilled. They 
define the boundaries for 
￿  as : 
* 0 a a £ <  where  6 . 1
* @ a . The degree of antagonism 
between two different ethnic groups is denoted by d. Obviously, in large samples such 
                                                 
5 We would like to thank Robert Barro who made most of this data available in electronic format. We 





as we are using this is not observed. Following Reynal-Querol (2000) we assume that 
the distance between any two different ethnic groups is one whereas that within the 





and d=0 if i=j. 
 
We calculate the polarization measure for three different values of 
￿  : 
￿  = 0, 
￿  =0.8 
and 
￿  =1.6. In addition we investigate the variant of the Esteban-Ray measure which 
Reynal-Querol proposes.  The four polarization measures are highly correlated with 
each other, but indeed measure something distinct from fractionalization for 
￿  > 0. 
For 
￿  = 0 the polarization measure is equivalent to the ethnic fractionalization index. 
Thus, the  correlation coefficient between polarization and fractionalization ranges 
between 1.0 (
￿  = 0) and 0.39 (
￿  = 1.6).  The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate 
that war and non-war countries had very similar values of polarization, the means and 
the standard deviations are virtually identical. 
 
Political exclusion can occur either through generalized repression or because some 
particular group is victimized. We measure political repression using the Polity III 
data set (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). Their democracy measure ranges 0-10 on an 
ascending scale of openness. There is a very large difference in the extent of 
democracy between conflict societies and peaceful societies: on average, conflict 
episodes are preceded by a democracy score less than half that which precedes peace 
episodes. We also investigate the Polity III measure of autocracy, and a measure of 
political openness published by Freedom House (the `Gastil Index’). The quantitative 
political science literature has already used these measures to explore the relationship 
between conflict and the political rights of a society. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) find 
that other than when repression is very severe it tends to increase the risk of conflict. 
 
However, even democracies may exclude if a minority is systematically victimized. 
One circumstance in which a stable winning coalition can form is if one ethnic group 
constitutes a majority. The incentive to exploit the minority diminishes the smaller is 
the minority, since there is less potential for exploitation. Hence, the most likely range 
for ethnic exclusion is if the largest ethnic group constitutes a majority, but not an 
overwhelming majority, of the population. We refer to this as ethnic dominance. 
Empirically, we specify some range for the largest group, eventually choosing 45-90 
percent of the population, and set an ethnic dominance dummy variable equal to unity 
for societies so characterized. The descriptive statistics suggest that ethnic dominance 
is unimportant: the proportion of conflict societies characterized by ethnic dominance 
is the same as that of peaceful societies. 
  
A second circumstance of political exclusion is if the poor are marginalized. As 
Hirschleifer (1991) shows, normally the poor will succeed in using the political 
contest to ameliorate their economic position. A high degree of economic inequality is 
therefore some indication that the poor are atypically marginalized. The opening page 
of Sen’s book On Economic Inequality asserts that `the relation between inequality 
and rebellion is indeed a close one’. The `rage of the poor’ is probably the most 
popular explanation of conflict after that of ethnic hatred, and may be exemplified by 
the Castro rebellion in Cuba. However, the case study evidence casts doubt on the 
hypothesis: a survey of fifteen violent civil conflicts concludes that `wars today are 





their deep-seated striving for a just society.’ (Anderson, 1999, p.9). An alternative 
route by which inequality might induce conflict is if rich regions pre-empt 
redistribution by attempting secession (Buchanan and Faith, 1987). Empirically, we 
investigate the effect of the inequality of both income and land. For income we 
investigate both the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the top-to-bottom quintiles of 
income, and for land we use the Gini coefficient. The data is from Deininger and 
Squire (1996, 1998). The conflict societies are on average slightly more unequal than 
the peaceful societies.  
 
Finally, we consider grievance due to a history of previous conflict. We have already 
discussed measures of previous conflict. However, while the greed model has used 
these measures to proxy rebellion-specific capital, the grievance model would 
interpret the same variables as proxies for intensified hatred. Conflict evidently 




As set out above, the proxies for constraints and the proxies for preferences are 
largely distinct and so can be compared as two non-nested econometric models. There 
is, however, no reason for the accounts to be exclusive and the aim of our econometric 
tests is to arrive at an integrated model which gives an account of conflict risk in 
terms of all those constraints and preferences which are significant. 
 
In interpreting the results a potential problem is if the same variable appears in both 
greed and grievance accounts. Ethnicity and religion enter both accounts, but the 
predictions are sufficiently different to be distinguishable. Entering as a constraint, 
fractionalization should make rebellion more difficult, and if ethnic and religious 
divisions are cross-cutting, the individual fractionalization measures should be 
dominated by our measure of social fractionalization. Entering via preferences, both 
ethnic and religious fractionalization should increase the risk of rebellion, and should 
be dominated by our measures of polarization. Ethnic dominance potentially proxies 
both ethnic hatred and objective political grievance. However, since our polarization 
measures should be better proxies for ethnic hatred, any remaining effect of ethnic 
dominance might reasonably be interpreted as being due to political exclusion. A 
more serious problem of interpretation is posed by the history of previous conflict. In 
the greed account this proxies rebellion-specific capital while in the grievance account 
it proxies hatred. We attempt to resolve this by testing for an interaction effect which 
could only be interpreted as rebellion-specific capital.  
 
A second problem of interpretation is that some variables have so many possible 
effects that even if they are statistically significant, the particular route by which they 
effect conflict risk must remain speculative. This is particularly pertinent for per 
capita income and secondary school enrolment. We return to these issues after 







Our empirical analysis attempts to predict the risk that a civil war will start during a 
five-year sub-period, through a logit regression in which the explanatory variables are 
characteristics at the start of the sub-period. Our data set describes a country in 1960, 
1965…1995 by a vector of characteristics which appertained either in that year or 
during the five years. We consider only countries which were at peace in that year and 
predict whether the peace was sustained through to the end of 1964, 1969…1999, 
respectively. Our model results depend on how societies which experienced outbreaks 
of war differed from the societies which sustained peace.
6  
 
We start with the greed model (see Table 3). Because per capita income and 
enrolment in secondary schooling are highly correlated, they cannot be used in the 
same regression. The first four columns include secondary schooling but not per 
capita income, which permits a sample of 123 countries. There are up to seven 
observations per country and our sample consists of 688 episodes of which 46 are war 
observations. The fifth column replicates the core regression using per capita income 
instead of secondary schooling, which permits a sample of 750 episodes of which 52 
are war observations. Recall that there have been 78 civil wars that meet our criteria: 
26 wars must be excluded due to missing data. 
 
The first column omits the effects of previous conflict. The two opportunity cost 
proxies are significant with the expected signs. A higher gross secondary school 
enrolment rate for males reduces the risk of war. Income growth per capita, measured 
for the previous five year period, decreases the risk of war. The effect of primary 
commodity exports on the risk of war is significant but non-linear. The highest risk of 
war is at a share in GDP of about 32 percent. The positive linear effect on risk is 
consistent with the hypothesis that ability to raise finance is a determinant of 
rebellion. The negative quadratic effect suggests that the increased tax revenue 
eventually augments the capacity of the government to defend itself sufficiently to 
offset the enhanced finances of the rebels. The other proxy for the ease of financing of 
rebellion, the dummy variable for the end of the Cold War, is negative as expected, 
but is insignificant. The three geography variables are all significant with expected 
signs. The elasticity of the risk of conflict with respect to population is less than unity, 
consistent with modest economies of scale in defense. More mountainous countries 
are more likely to experience a civil war, while a higher concentration of the 
population decreases the risk of conflict. Social fractionalization enters with the 
expected negative sign but is not significant. 
                                                 
6 In our earlier work (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) we used a much smaller sample of wars and conflated 
war starts with war duration, using a tobit procedure. We now regard this approach as flawed since 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In column 2 we introduce a dummy variable for previous conflicts. Recall that this 
may proxy `rebellion-specific capital’ or simply reflect omitted country-specific 
effects. Here we include any civil wars which occurred between the end of World War 
II and 1995. The coefficient on this previous war dummy is highly significant: 
previous wars increase the risk of new civil war. In column 3 we distinguish between 
the two interpretations of the previous war dummy by adding to the model the length 
of the peace period measured in months since the end of the last civil war. The 
coefficient is negative and significant, i.e. the longer the peace period the lower the 
risk of conflict. The coefficient on the previous war dummy is now insignificant. 
Thus, the peace period is a more precise measure of the effect than is the previous war 
dummy (p=0.59). This indicates that the risk decays after conflict, as might rebel-
specific capital, rather than being a proxy for unobserved country-specific effects. In 
column 4 we therefore drop the insignificant previous war and post-Cold War 
dummies, leaving a model in which greed causes initial conflict; conflict causes some 
effect such as the accumulation of rebellion-specific capital, and this causes further 
conflict.
 In the last column we present an alternative specification in which we include 
the average income per capita as a measure of opportunity costs instead of schooling. 
The results are very similar, although the overall performance of the regression 
slightly deteriorates. The addition of this previous war effect has one important 
consequence for the other variables in the greed model: the negative effect of social 
fractionalization on conflict risk now becomes statistically significant. Fractionalized 
societies are actually safer than homogenous societies.  
 
Recall that the duration of previous peace may proxy either rebellion-specific capital 
or hatred. In Table 3 we attempt to distinguish between these interpretations by 
investigating whether the effect of the duration of previous peace is itself affected by 
the size of the diaspora. Since the data set on the size of diasporas in the USA reduces 
the number of countries on which we have data, the sample size is consequentially 
radically reduced from the 750 observations and 52 wars which is our maximum 
sample in the previous analysis. In order to preserve sample size we therefore retreat 
to a more parsimonious version of the model, dropping four sample-constraining 
peripheral explanatory variables: ethnic and religious fractionalization, geographic 
concentration of the population, the extent to which the terrain is mountainous, and 
the rate of growth in the previous five year period. The remaining explanatory 
variables are thus per capita GDP, primary commodity exports, population, and the 
number of months since the previous conflict. Even with these data-restoring 
deletions, the sample size is reduced to 595 observations (containing 29 war 
observations). However, all the included explanatory variables remain significant. 
 
On this sample, we then test for the effect of a diaspora. We measure the size of the 
diaspora relative to the resident population in the country of origin. To allow for a 
fading post-conflict effect, we interact this measure with the number of months since 
the previous conflict, dividing the former by the latter. This variable, `diaspora/peace’ 
in Table 3, is added to the regression, the result being shown in column 6. The 
variable is positive and significant, while the duration of peace itself is not significant 
at the conventional level (p=0.14). A large diaspora considerably increases the risk of 
further conflict. If we compare the post-conflict society with the largest diaspora 
against that with the smallest, with other variables at their mean values, after five 






However, while this result is consistent with the analytic model, it is also open to a 
more anodyne interpretation. Evidently, diasporas are to an extent endogenous to the 
intensity of conflict: when civil war occurs, many people leave and settle in the USA. 
Hence, the size of the diaspora might simply be proxying the intensity of conflict. The 
result may therefore simply show that more severe conflicts have a higher risk of 
renewed conflict. To test for this we decomposed observed diasporas into a 
component which is exogenous to the intensity of conflict and a residual component 
which is therefore endogenous to its intensity. For this decomposition we estimated a 
simple migration model, reported in Appendix A1. The size of the diaspora in a 
census year is predicted to be a function of its size in the previous census, time, per 
capita income in the country of origin, and whether there was a war in the intervening 
period. This model predicts the size of the diaspora with reasonable accuracy. We 
then replace the diaspora data used in the model with estimated diaspora size in all 
cases where the observed diaspora is for a year subsequent to a conflict. Thus, all 
post-conflict observations of diasporas are estimates which are purged of any effect 
from the intensity of conflict. The difference between these estimates and the actual 
figures are then used as an additional variable, measuring that part of the diaspora 
which is potentially endogenous to the intensity of conflict. Both of these measures 
are then introduced into the regression in place of the previous single measure of the 
diaspora. The results are reported in column 7 of Table 3. The purged measure of the 
diaspora remains significant, and the size of the coefficient is only slightly altered. 
Further, its coefficient is not significantly different from that on the endogenous 
diaspora measure. Had the effect of the diaspora been simply a proxy for the intensity 
of conflict, neither of these would have been the case. The purged variable would 
have been insignificant, and the coefficient on the endogenous measure would have 
been larger. This suggests that the substantial effect of the diaspora on the risk of 
conflict renewal is indeed due to its financial contribution to war start-up. This result 
is not only of interest for its perspective on diasporas, it also helps to distinguish 
between the `rebellion-specific capital’ and hatred interpretations of the duration of 
peace effect. If the duration of peace effect is proxying rebel-specific capital, it is easy 
to see why there would be such a strong interaction effect from diasporas. A rebel 
organization can be sustained financially during a period of post-conflict peace by 
contributions from the diaspora: hence, rebel organizational capital decays less rapidly 
the larger is the diaspora. For the hatred interpretation to remain in contention we 
would need to believe that diasporas substantially slow the rate of decay of hatred 
among the non-diaspora population. While some such effect is possible, diasporas are 
small and distant. It is more plausible to interpret their disproportionate influence as 
being due to their genuinely disproportionate financial power, rather than to some 





Table 4: Grievance Model 
 
  1  2  3 
 







































Income inequality    0.015 
(0.018) 
 
Land inequality      0.461 
(1.305) 


















N  850  604  603 
No of wars  59  41  38 
Pseudo R
2  0.13  0.11  0.17 
Log likelihood  -185.57  -133.46  -117.12 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Column 1: the two measures of fractionalization and ethnic dominance are not jointly significant.  
 
 
In Table 4 we turn to the examination of a rebellion which is motivated only by 
grievance. In the first column we examine the relationship between ethnic dominance, 
ethnic and religious fractionalization, ethnic polarization, democracy and the duration 
of peace. At this stage we define ethnic dominance as occurring when the largest 
ethnic group constitutes 45-90 percent of the population and measure polarization 
with a = 1.6. These specifications are justified in Section 4 where we investigate 
robustness to alternative definitions. As in the greed model, we control for geographic 
military advantage by including population, the dispersion of the population, and 
mountainous terrain. Since we are not including any lagged variables we can use 850 
observations of which 59 observations experienced an outbreak of civil war. The 
results suggest that a higher degree of ethnic fractionalization increases the risk of war 
and that a greater openness of political institutions reduces the risk of conflict. 





individually nor jointly significant. In the second column we add the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality as an explanatory variable and in column 3 we add the Gini 
coefficient of land inequality as an alternative measure of inequality. Neither measure 
is significant. Note that the sample size is reduced when we include the income 
inequality measures. However, we are still analyzing a substantial number of war 
occurrences (41 in column 2 and 38 in column 3).
7 All three grievance models have 
very low explanatory power, the regressions only have an R
2 of 0.17 or lower. 
 
We now turn to the question of which model, greed or grievance, provides a better 
explanation of the risk of civil war. Since the two models are non-nested, i.e. one 
model is not a special case of the other, we use the J-test as suggested by Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1981). This non-nested test is based on the following artificial 
nesting procedure. First we explain the risk of civil war, p, in terms of the two 





Based on these logit regressions we calculate the predicted probabilities and add these 
predicted values,  p ˆ
greed and  p ˆ
grievance to our alternative models. 
 
(1) p=f(greed,  p ˆ
grievance) 
(2) p=f(grievance,  p ˆ
greed) 
 
According to the J-test the significance of the coefficients of these added variables 
enables us to choose between the two different models. If  p ˆ
grievance  is significant in 
the greed model we reject the greed model in favor of the grievance model. If  p ˆ
greed  
is significant in the grievance model we reject the grievance model in favor of the 
greed model. As can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5,  p ˆ
grievance is significant in 
the greed model and  p ˆ
greed is significant in the grievance model. Thus, we conclude 
that while the greed model is superior, some elements of the grievance model are 
likely to add to its explanatory power. We therefore investigate the combination of the 
two models as presented in column 3 of Table 5. 
 
Since this combined model includes income inequality and a lagged term our sample 
size is much reduced (479 observations). Omitting inequality (which remains 
insignificant) increases the sample size to 665 observations in column 4. In this 
combined model neither democracy, ethnic and religious fractionalization nor the 
post-Cold War dummy are significant. Other variables are statistically significant or 
close to significance and the overall fit is reasonable (pseudo R
2 of about 0.26). Since 
both the grievance and greed models are nested in the combined model, we can use a 
likelihood ratio test to determine whether the combined model is superior. We can 
reject the validity of the restrictions proposed by the grievance model, but not by the 
greed model.
8 
                                                 
7 We also tried the ratio of the income shares of the top to the bottom quintiles. This was also 
insignificant. 























































































# 2 =7.85, p=0.165; 













 Table 5: Combined Greed and Grievance Model 
 











Ln GDP per capita           
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.108 
(0.044)*** 



























Social fractionalization  -0.0002 
(0.0001)*** 





























































Post-coldwar  -0.209 
(0.457) 





Income inequality      0.025 
(0.024) 
   
































       
Greed predicted value    1.052 
(0.212)*** 
     
N  665  665  479  665  665 
No of wars  46  46  32  46  46 
Pseudo R
2  0.24  0.25  0.24  0.26  0.25 
Log likelihood  -126.69  -125.29  -89.55  -124.60  -124.79 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively 
 
Although the combined model is superior to the greed and grievance models, several 
variables are completely insignificant and we drop them sequentially. First we 
exclude the post-Cold War dummy, then religious fractionalization, then democracy
9, 
then polarization, then ethnic fractionalization (column 9). Social fractionalization and 
mountains are both marginally significant in this model (p-value around 0.13) and are 
jointly significant. When either is dropped, the other becomes significant and in the 
present model there is little to choose between them. However, when we switch to the 
larger sample permitted by replacing male secondary school enrolment with per capita 
income, there is a clear ranking. When both variables are included, social  
                                                 
9 We tried different specifications to test for the effect of political repression by investigating non-linear 
effects, by including the autocracy score instead of the democracy score, and by using the difference 
between the two variables as suggested by Londregan and Poole (1996). We also tried the Freedom 
House measure of political freedom, but neither of these alternative political repression measures were 





Table 5 continued 
 
 














Ln GDP per capita            -0.950 
(0.245)*** 



























































     
Polarization 


















































































  0.014 
(0.009) 
N  665  688  688  688  688  750 
No of wars  46  46  46  46  46  52 
Pseudo R
2  0.25  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.24  0.22 
Log likelihood  -125.05  -125.73  -126.67  -127.11  -128.21  -146.84 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively 
 
fractionalization is highly significant, whereas mountains are insignificant. We 
therefore drop mountains yielding the baseline model of column 10 and its variant 
with per capita income replacing secondary enrolment in column 11.  No further 
reduction in the model is accepted, and no additions of variables included in our 
previous models are accepted. The baseline model and its variant yield very similar 
results although the variant has less explanatory power and two variables lose 
significance (ethnic dominance and geographic dispersion). That male secondary 
school enrolment and per capita income yield such similar results suggests that 
several interpretations may be consistent with the results. While male enrolment may 
proxy the opportunity cost of joining a rebel movement, it may also proxy other 
effects of income and education.  
 
Our baseline model allows us to calculate the change in the probability of war-starts 
for different values of the explanatory variables. We present these calculations in 
Appendix Table A2.  At the mean of all variables the risk of a war-start is about 11.5 
percent. Our model predicts that a country with the worst characteristics (lowest per 
capita income, lowest GDP growth and highest population growth, a primary 
commodity export share of 0.32, the largest population, the lowest fractionalization, 
ethnic dominance, a geography Gini coefficient of zero and only one month of peace) 





would be a very safe society. We now calculate how the change in one variable (while 
the others are assumed to take their mean values) affects the probability of 
experiencing a civil war.  
 
The two opportunity cost proxies, economic growth and male secondary school 
enrollment, both have substantial effects. An additional percentage point on the 
growth rate reduces the risk of war by around two percentage points (a decline from 
11.5 percent to 9.3 percent). If the enrollment rate is 10 percentage points higher than 
the average the risk of war is reduced by about three percentage points (a decline in 
the risk from 11.5 percent to 8.6 percent). Alternatively, enrolment may proxy the 
level of economic development. A doubling of per capita income reduces the risk of 
war by five percentage points. The effect of primary commodity exports is 
considerable: at the risk-maximizing value of the primary commodity export share 
(0.32), the risk of civil war is about 22 percent, while a country with no natural 
resource exports only has a probability of a war-start of one percent. Hence, the basic 
economic variables - the level, growth and structure of income - are highly important 
in conflict risk. 
 
Consistent with the hypothesis that cohesion is important for rebel effectiveness, 
social fractionalization makes a society substantially safer: a maximally fractionalized 
society has a conflict risk only one quarter that of a homogenous society. However, if 
a country is characterized by ethnic dominance its risk of conflict is nearly doubled. 
Thus, the net effect of increased social fractionalization need not be monotonic. 
Starting from homogeneity, as fractionalization is increased a society is likely to 
become characterized by ethnic dominance, although this will be removed by further 
fractionalization. Directly after a civil war there is a high probability of a re-start, the 
risk is about 32 percent. This risk declines over time at around one percentage point 
per annum. Both ethnic dominance and the length of time since a previous conflict 
could be proxies for hatred. However, two results suggest that other interpretations are 
more plausible. First, neither polarization nor ethnic and religious fractionalization are 
significant risk factors. Thus, ethnic dominance is perhaps more likely to be proxying 
structural political exclusion than inter-group hatreds. Secondly, recall that the rate at 
which conflict risk declines during post-conflict peace is highly sensitive to the size of 
the diaspora. This suggests that during periods of conflict societies accumulate 
rebellion-specific capital and organizations.  
 
Geography matters. The elasticity of the risk of conflict with respect to population is 
less than unity (significantly so in the income variant, though not quite in the 
baseline).  This is consistent with there being economies of scale in deterrence. Lastly, 
countries with a highly concentrated population have a very low risk of conflict, 
whereas those with a highly dispersed population have a very high risk of civil war 





4. Robustness Checks 
 
We now test these baseline results for robustness. We consider the sensitivity both to 
data and to method. With respect to data, we investigate the effect of outlying 
observations, and of different definitions of the dependent and independent variables. 
With respect to method, we investigate random effects, fixed effects and rare events 
bias. 
 
We investigated outlying observations through two approaches, graphs of the 46 
conflict episodes used in the baseline regression and an analysis of influential data 
points. Because our sample is unbalanced as between events and non-events, the 
potential problems of outliers arises predominantly among the 46 conflict episodes 
used in the baseline regression rather than the 642 peace episodes. Further, of these 
conflict episodes, 24 were first-time conflicts and 22 were repeat conflicts. We first 
investigate these conflict episodes graphically, the first-time conflicts being shown by 
dots and the repeat conflicts by triangles. The mean of the peace episodes is shown by 
a cross.  
 
In Figure 1 we plot the level and structure of income: that is, per capita income 
against the primary commodity export ratio. Two observations, Iran in 1970 and 1975, 
are outliers in both dimensions. Especially since these two observations are for the 
same country at consecutive periods, results that were dependent upon these 
observations could not be regarded as general. Two other observations, Angola in 
1990 and Congo in 1995, have high ratios of primary commodity dependence relative 
to the other observations in the war sample. However, these observations are not 
outliers relative to the peace sample: 26 peace observations have higher primary 
commodity dependence than the most extreme conflict observation. 
 
In Figure 2 we plot male secondary school enrolment against the growth rate of per 
capita income, both being proxies for the opportunity cost of joining a rebel 
organization. One observation, Romania in 1989, is an outlier in both dimensions. 
According to the data, Romania during the late 1980s offered atypically attractive 
opportunities to young men in schooling and employment. We may well be suspicious 
of the Romanian data and so results that were dependent upon this observation would 
themselves be highly doubtful.  
 
Thus, Iran and Romania appear to be doubtful observations and so we re-estimate the 
baseline regressions dropping these countries (Table 6, column 1). No results are 
overturned, but the performance of the regression improves and variables are more 
significant. While this tends to support the diagnosis of these observations as 






Fi gur e 1: I ncome S tructure and Leve l











0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
G D P per capi ta i n U S$






Fi gur e 2: M a le Secondar y S chool i ng and I ncome G r owt h
- 6 . 2 3 6
- 9 . 3 2 1
6 8 - 1 0 . 5 9 3 - 1 0 . 4 8 5












0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
School E nrol ment R ates
















0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0
Rel i gi ous Fracti onal i zati on
















0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
G eographi c D i spersi on






Fi gur e 5: D e m ocr acy and I ncome Di stribut i on
I n d i a 1980
Sri L a n k a 1970











0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
D em ocracy






Fi gur e 6: I nfl uenti al Data Poin ts















There are four observations of highly negative growth: Angola in 1970-74, Zaire in 
1990-95, Iran in 1975-79 and Iraq in 1980-84. All of these growth collapses appear to 
be genuine, and they occur in different countries. However, were the results to be 
dependent upon these four observations, an implication would be that the risk of 
conflict was not monotonic in growth, but rather influenced by severe collapses. All 
four of these growth collapses are cases in which the subsequent conflict was a repeat. 
Were first-time conflict to be collinear with subsequent growth collapses, a more 
general problem of interpretation would arise. However, both analytically and 
empirically, post-conflict situations can be characterized by atypically high growth as 
well as by decline (Collier, 1999). We  investigate whether the four extreme growth 
collapses account for the effect of growth on conflict risk, deleting them along with 
Iran and Romania (Table 6, column 2). Growth remains significant, and its coefficient  
is only slightly reduced. Hence, we can conclude that the increased risk of conflict 
due to slow growth is not confined to episodes of growth collapse, but is a more 
continuous relationship. 
 
In Figure 3 we plot religious and ethnic fractionalization. Although there is a wide 
dispersion of both measures, there are no obvious outliers. Figure 4 plots geographic 
dispersion against mountainous terrain. Again, there are no obvious outliers. In Figure 
5 we plot two measures of grievance: democracy and income distribution. Again, 
although there is a wide dispersion, there are no obvious outliers, nor are the extreme 
conflict observations outliers relative to the peace observations. Nor are there obvious 
outliers in respect of diasporas. The conflict episode with the largest diaspora, 
Nicaragua in 1980, had 1.6 emigrants in the USA per 100 inhabitants. Since the mean   
for the peace observations was 1.4, we conclude that outliers cannot account for our 
result on the effect of diasporas on conflict risk.  
 
Four peaceful countries have particularly high values of primary dependence: Saudi 
Arabia, Guyana, Oman, and Trinidad and Tobago. It is possible that these 
observations account for the non-monotonic relationship to conflict risk. This might 
imply that the reduction in conflict risk only occurred at extreme values of commodity 
dependence. In Table 6 column 3 we present our baseline model excluding the four 
high primary commodity exporters. The main results are unchanged and the non-






Table 6: Investigation of Outliers 
 
  1  2  3  4 
  Excluding Iran 
and Romania 
Excluding Iran 



































































































N  674  671  662  685 
No. of wars  42  39  46  43 
Pseudo R
2  0.25  0.22  0.21  0.29 
Log likelihood  -118.40  -116.17  -122.23  -114.04 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 























































































































































































) commodity export to GDP ratio, namely Saudi Arabia, 
Guyana, Oman and Trinidad and Tobago. Their average primary commodity export to GDP ratio is 0.504 (sample 
average  0.158). 
 
We next analyze whether our regression results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
influential data points. Based on the methods developed by Pregibon (1981) we 
examined which observations may be influential and investigated whether omitting 
these observations from our baseline model changed our results. We used the 
following method to identify outliers.
10 First we predicted the probability of a civil 
war occurring, 
^
i p . Since the residuals of the regression, 
^
i i p y - are heteroskedastic 
we calculated the Pearson residual: 
 
) 1 ( / ) (
^ ^ ^
i i i i i p p p y r - - =   
                                                 






Large values of ri indicate a poor fit for the ith observation. We also examined the 
standardized Pearson residual 
 
) 1 ( / ii i
Std
i h r r - =  
 
While these measures indicate outliers they do not indicate whether an observation 
has a large influence on the estimated coefficients or on the overall fit. On the other 
hand some observations can influence the estimates even if the residual is small. We 
searched for influential data points by computing an influence measure which is the 
counterpart to Cook’s distance for the linear regression model 
 
2 2
^ ^ ^ ^
) 1 /( ) )( ( )' ( ii ii i i i i h h r Var C - = D D = b b b  
 
where hii is a vector containing the diagonal elements of matrix H 
 
' ) ( ) 1 (
^ ^ ^ ^





' ) ' ( V X X V X X V H




V is a diagonal matrix with  ) 1 (
^ ^
i i p p - on the diagonal and  ) (
^ ^
b Var  is the 




In figure 6 we plot this measure of influence. We find three influential observations: 
Congo 1997, Iran 1974 and Romania 1989. However, when we omitted these three 
observations from our regression, the overall fit of the regressions improved (from 
previously R2=0.24 to R2=0.29) and all of the coefficients remain statistically 
significant. (Table 6, Column 4). 
 
We next turn to questions of variable definition. The most contentious aspect of the 
dependent variable is distinguishing between whether a country has a single long war 
or multiple shorter wars interrupted by periods of peace. In the above analysis we 
have been guided by the judgement of the political scientists who built the original 
data sets. Some peace periods are, however, quite short and it might be better to 
conceptualize these as interludes in a single war. We therefore reclassified all those 
wars which were separated by peace periods of less than one month, and then of less 
than one year, as continuous wars (Table 7A, column 1). The baseline results are not 
altered by the former redefinition, but when peace periods of less than twelve months 
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marginally insignificant (p=0.12), although the coefficient is little effected.
11    
 
In the baseline we define ethnic dominance as the largest ethnic group constituting 45-90 
percent of the population. In Table 7B we investigate six other definitions which either vary 
the range of the population or use the share of the largest group regardless of its size. As the 
range is changed from 45-90 percent the significance level and the coefficient are both 
reduced, while if the definition is changed more radically to being the population share of the 
largest group it is completely insignificant.
12 The range 45-90 percent is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction of the range over which a group which would have both the power and 
the incentive to exploit others (see Collier, 2001). In Table 7A we also demonstrate that 
`social fractionalization’, our measure of cross-cutting cleavages, dominates the other 
possible aggregation procedures for ethnic and religious diversity. When this measure of 
fractionalization is included with the ethnic and religious diversity indices either together or 
individually, it is significant whereas the underlying indices are not significant. 
  
In the baseline we use only the most extreme measure of polarization over the range proposed 
by Esteban and Ray (1994). However, if this measure is replaced by either the lower bound 
(a = 0), or the central measure (a = 0.8) the results are unaffected: polarization remains 
insignificant and the other variables remain significant. We also experimented with the 
alternative measure proposed by Reynal-Querol (2000), and with the number of ethnic 
groups, but with the same result. 
 
In Table 8 we investigate a number of different estimation issues. We concentrate on the 
analysis of random effects, fixed effects, time effects and a correction for rare events. We re-
estimated our models using random effects. For the baseline model we find that the panel 
data estimator is not different from the pooled estimator, i.e. we accept the hypothesis that we 
can pool across the observations.
13 The estimation of fixed effects logits was only possible on 
a very small sub-sample of the observations. The countries for which the dependent variable 
does not vary over time (the majority of countries experienced only peace) cannot be 
included in the analysis. Although the fixed effects test is very severe, the non-monotonic 
effect of primary commodity exports remains significant. Were the effect of primary 
commodity exports dependent only upon cross-section data, it might suggest that the variable 
was proxying some other characteristic such as geography. However, the fixed effects 
regression uses only changes in primary commodity dependence, and so reduces the scope for 
alternative interpretations. 
                                                 
11 We also examined the effect of time since the previous conflict in more detail by including the natural 
logarithm of the peace variable or its square, however, a linear decay term provides a better fit. Note that the 
measure of peace since the end of the civil war is somewhat imprecise since we only measure it from the end of 
the war to the initial year of each sub-period. A duration model of post-war peace would allow a more detailed 
analysis of this peace effect, however, the duration model results in Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2001) 
support the results presented in this paper. 
12 We also experimented with various other definitions of ethnic dominance, such as the dummy taking a value 
of one if the largest ethnic group made up 50-75, 50-80, 50-85 percent of the population. Neither of these 





















￿ 2 =0 (p = 0.998). Thus, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the panel data and pooled 
estimator provide the same results.  33 
Table 8: Estimation Issues 
 
  1  2  3  4 
  Random Effects  Fixed Effects  Pooled Logit plus 
Time dummies 




























































































    0.578 
(0.608) 
 
T80-84      1.137 
(0.602)* 
 
T85-89      -0.013 
(0.757) 
 
T90-94      0.802 
(0.677) 
 
T95-99      -0.492 
(0.921) 
 
N  688  145  688  688 
No of wars  46  44  46   
Pseudo R
2      0.26   
Log likelihood  -128.21  -38.18  -124.30   
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
We analyzed whether time effects matter by including time dummies in the model. Based on 
a log likelihood ratio test we cannot reject the hypothesis that the time dummies are zero.
14  
 









￿ 2 =7.83, 6 restrictions, p=0.251.  34 
Finally, in the last column of Table 8 we use a recently developed correction method for rare 
events data (King and Zeng, 2001). Our data is characterized by a relatively small number of 
events (wars), only about seven percent of the observations being characterized by a civil war 
outbreak. The results presented in King and Zeng (2001) suggest that standard logit 
estimation underestimates the probability of an event occurring when the events are rare. We 
used their correction procedure but found the differences between the standard logit results 
and the rare events corrected results to be negligible. Using the rare events logit procedure, 
all coefficients on the variables have the same signs and are significant at the same levels. 
The mean of the predicted probabilities obtained from the rare events logit regression have a 
mean of 0.072. Thus, we find that the corrected results are very similar to the logit results. 
We therefore conclude that the use of uncorrected logit regressions is an appropriate method 
for our empirical analysis.   
 
We examined a number of different model specifications. We found that none of the 
following geographic and demographic characteristics were significant: forest coverage, 
population density and the proportion of young men aged 15 to 29.
15 
 
5. Conclusion and Interpretation 
 
Using a comprehensive data set of large-scale civil conflict over the period 1960-99 we 
examine the risk of civil war using logit regressions to predict the risk of war in each five-
year period. We find that a model which focuses on the constraints facing rebel organizations 
performs well, whereas objective indicators of grievance add little explanatory power. The 
model is robust to a range of tests for outliers, redefinitions and alternative specifications. 
 
The level, growth and structure of income are all economically and statistically significant 
factors in conflict risk. Whether higher income is associated with reduced conflict because it 
strengthens government finances, because it occupies young males in secondary school, or 
because of some more general attitudinal effects remains unresolved. That faster growth  
reduces conflict risk may be because it raises the opportunity cost of joining rebellion, 
although it could simply generate hope of better times. That primary commodity dependence 
increases the risk of conflict is consistent with the evident role which primary commodities 
play as sources of rebel finance. Primary commodity dependence is also associated with poor 
governance and increased exposure to economic shocks (Auty, 2000), either of which could 
increase conflict risk. However, we found that a further important risk factor is the size of the 
diaspora. The case study literature highlights the role of diasporas in financing rebel 
organizations. Hence, if only by Occam’s Razor, this strengthens our interpretation that the 
route by which primary commodities affect conflict is via rebel finances. At high levels of 
primary commodity dependence conflict risk declines again: we have interpreted this as due 
to the strengthening of government finances, and hence deterrence capability. 
 
Despite the attention given to ethnic and religious differences as sources of conflict, we have 
found no effect of polarization, while greater social fractionalization actually reduces conflict 
risk. This is consistent with the rebel organization having a disproportionate need for social 
cohesion in its recruitment, so that rebellion is more difficult in fractionalized societies. We 
                                                 
15 The proportion of the population living in urban areas was statistically significant when we excluded the 
geographic dispersion of the population. However, when we included both proxies for the concentration of the 
population, the geographic dispersion measure remained statistically significant while the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas was marginally insignificant (p=0.11). 
  35 
do, however, find that ethnic dominance (defined as the largest group constituting 45-90 
percent of the population) moderately increases conflict risk. We have found no effects of 
either political rights or inequality on conflict risk: hence, we concur that `there is at best a 
tenuous relationship between war and justice as its motive’ (Anderson, 1999, p.11).  
 
We have found that geography matters. Conflict risk does not increase proportionately with 
population, this being consistent with scale economies in deterrence capability. However, risk 
is increased by population dispersion and possibly by mountainous terrain.  
 
Overall, these results are consistent with economic models of conflict risk in which the 
critical parameters are the financial opportunities for rebels, the social and geographic 
constraints which they face, and the financial capability of the government to provide 
defense. They are harder to reconcile with accounts of conflict which stress ethnic, religious, 
political or economic grievances. 
  36 
References 
 
Alesina, A., S. Oetzler, N. Roubini, and P. Swagel. 1996. ‘Political Instability and Economic 
Growth.’ Journal of Economic Growth 1:189-211. 
 
Anderson, Mary B. 1999. Do No Harm. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.  
 
Angoustures, Aline and Valerie Pascal. 1996. ‘Diasporas et financement des conflits,’ in 
Francois Jean and Jean-Christohpe Rufin (eds.) Economie des Guerres Civiles, Hachette, 
Paris. 
 
Auty, R.M. 2000. ‘How Natural Resources Affect Economic Development.’ Development 
Policy Review 18(4):347-64. 
 
Barro, R. J. 1991. ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.’ The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106:407-43. 
 
Barrett, D. B., ed. 1982. World Christian Encyclopedia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Buchanan, J.M. and R.L. Faith. 1987. ‘Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Towards a 
Theory of Internal Exit.’ American Economic Review, 77:1023-31. 
 
Collier, P. 1999. ‘On the Economic Consequences of Civil War.’ Oxford Economic Papers 
51:168-83. 
 
__________. 2000. ‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 
44: 839-53. 
 
__________.2001. Ethnic diversity: An economic analysis of its implications.’ Economic 
Policy 32: 129-66. 
 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. 1998. ‘On the Economic Causes of Civil War.’ Oxford Economic 
Papers, 50:563-73.  
 
Collier, P., A. Hoeffler, and M. Söderbom. 2001. ‘On the Duration of Civil.’ Policy Working 
Paper 2861, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
Davidson R. and J.G. MacKinnon. 1981. ‘Several Tests for model specification in the 
presence of alternative hypotheses.’ Econometrica 49:781-793. 
 
Deininger, K., and L. Squire. 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality. World 
Bank Economic Review 10:565-91. 
 
Deininger, K. and Squire, L. 1998. ‘New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and 
Growth.’ Journal of Development Economics 57:249-287. 
 
Easterly, W. and R. Levine. 1997. ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.’ 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:1203-49. 
  37 
__________. 1998. ‘Troubles with the Neighbours: Africa’s Problem, Africa’s Opportunity.’ 
Journal of African Economies 7(1):120-42. 
 
Esteban, J.-M., and D. Ray. 1994. ‘On the Measurement of Polarization.’ Econometrica 
62(4): 819-51. 
 
__________.1999. ‘Conflict and Distribution.’ Journal of Economic Theory 87:379-415. 
 
Gerrard, A.J.W. 2000. ‘What is a Mountain?’ Mimeo.  DECRG, World Bank. 
 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, and Havard Hegre. 1997. Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of 
Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41:283-310. 
 
Grossman, H. I. 1999. Kleptrocracy and Revolutions. Oxford Economic Papers 51:267-283. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton. Princeton University Press.  
 
Hirshleifer, J. 1991. ‘The Paradox of Power’. Economics and Politics 3:171-200. 
 
Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. ‘Tracking Democracy' s Third Wave with the 
Polity III Data’. Journal of Peace Research 32:469-482. 
 
Kaplan, Robert, D. 2000. The Coming Anarchy, New York, Random House. 
 
King, G., and L. Zeng. 2001. ' Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data' .  Political Analysis 
9(2):137-163. 
 
Konrad, Kai, A. and Stergios Skaperdas. 1998. ‘Extortion’. Economica, 65:461-77. 
 
Londregan, J.B. and K. T. Poole. 1996. ‘Does High Income Promote Democracy?’ World 
Politics 49:1-30. 
 
Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. 
London: Sage Publications. 
 
Mauro, P. 1995. ‘Corruption and Growth’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110:681-712. 
 
Pregibon, D. 1981. Logistic Regression Diagnostics. The Annals of Statistics 9:705-24. 
 
Reynal-Querol, M. 2000. ‘Religious Conflict and Growth: Theory and Evidence’. Ph. D. 
Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
  
Sachs, J. and A.M. Warner. 2000. ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’. In 
Leading Issues in Economic Development, 7
th ed. G.M. Meier and J.E. Rauch, Oxford 
University Press. 
Sen, A. 1973. On economic inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2000. Yearbook of World Armaments 
and Disarmaments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  38 
Summers, R., and A. Heston. 1991. The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of 
International Comparisons, 1950-1988. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99:327-68. 
 
USSR, 1964. Atlas Narodov Mira, Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State 
Geological Committee of the USSR. Moscow. 
 
World Bank, 2000. World Development Indicators, Washington DC.   39 
Appendix 
 
A1: A Simple Migration model 
 
Our estimation of migration is based on the following model: 
 
diasit =  1.163· d i a s i , t-1 – 0.002· l n GDPi, t-1 + 0.003· wari, t-1 + 0.003· T80 + 0.005· T90 + 0.013 
 (0.045)***     (0.001)**         (0.03)        (0.002)        (0.002)*** (0.008) 
 
Where dias denotes diaspora which is measured as the ratio of emigrants in the USA to the 
total population of the country of origin. The variable “war” is a war dummy, measured at t-1 
it takes a value of one if the country experienced a civil war in the previous period. The 
method of estimation is OLS. The data is measured at the beginning of each decade, i.e. 
1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. The regression includes time dummies, T, which are jointly 
significant. 
 
Based on this simple migration model we estimated the size of the diaspora at time t. 
 
Ù
it dias = xit· b ˆ  
 
For countries which experienced a previous civil war we used these estimated values to 
correct for a possible endogeneity problem.
16 We replaced a total of 64 observations. For 
countries which did not experience a civil war we use the actual diaspora data. We took the 
averages of this corrected diaspora data measured in 1960 and 1970 (1970 and 1980, 1980 
and 1990) in order to obtain values for 1965, 1975 and 1985. For 1995 we use the 
observations measured in 1990. 
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In order to proxy the size of the diaspora we used US immigration data from the US Bureau 
of the Census. To capture the relative size of the population we divided the US immigration 




Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source (Atlas Narodov Mira, 1964) we 
calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This variable takes the value of one if one single 
ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total population and zero otherwise. 
We would like to thank Tomila Lankina for the translation of the original data source. 
 
Forest Coverage 
We used the FAO measure of the proportion of a country’s terrain which is covered in woods 
and forest. Source: http://www.fao.org/forestry 
 
GDP per capita 
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the Penn 
World Tables 5.6 (Summers and Heston 1991). Since the data is only available from 1960-92 
we used the growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators 1998 in order to obtain income data for the 1990s. 
 
Geographic Dispersion of the Population 
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country by country basis. Based on 
population data for 400km
2 cells we generated a Gini coefficient of population dispersion for 
each country. A value of 0 indicates that the population is evenly distributed across the 
country and a value of 1 indicates that the total population is concentrated in one  area. Data is 
available for 1990 and 1995. For years prior to 1990 we used the 1990 data. We would like to 
thank Uwe Deichman of the World Bank’s Geographic Information System Unit for 
generating this data. He used the following data sources: Center for International Earth 
Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University; International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI); and World Resources Institute (WRI). 2000. Gridded Population 




The proportion of a country’s terrain which is mountainous was measured by John Gerrard, a 
physical geographer specialized in mountainous terrain. His measure is not only based on 
altitude but takes into account plateaus and rugged uplands. The data is presented in Gerrard 
(2000).  43 
Population 
Population measures the total population, the data source is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 1998.  
 
 
Primary commodity exports/GDP 
Following Sachs and Warner (2000) we measure the abundance of natural resources by the 
ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP. The data on primary commodity exports as well 
as GDP was obtained from the World Bank. Export and GDP data are measured in current 
US dollars.  
 
 
Social, ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization 
We proxy social fractionalization in a combined measure of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
index. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country 
do not speak the same language. Data is only available for 1960. In the economics literature 
this measure was first used by Mauro (1995). Using data from Barrett (1982) on religious 
affiliations we constructed an analogous religious fractionalization index. Following Barro 
(1997) we aggregated the various religious affiliations into nine categories: Catholic, 
Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Eastern Religions (other than Buddhist), 
Indigenous Religions and no religious affiliation.  
 
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that the 
society is completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a completely 
heterogeneous society. 
 
We calculated our social fractionalization index as the product of the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethno-linguistic or the 
religious fractionalization index, whichever is the greater. By adding either index we avoid 
classifying a country as homogenous (a value of zero) if the country is ethnically 
homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa 
 
Peace Duration 
This variable measures the length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil war. 
For countries which never experienced a civil war we measure the peace period since the end 
of World War II. 
 
War Starts 
We use mainly the data collected by Singer and Small (1984, 1994). We would like to thank 
Nicholas Sambanis for extending and updating this data set for us. 
 
 